INTRODUCTION
National court involvement in international arbitration is a fact of life as prevalent as the weather. National courts become involved in arbitration for a whole host of reasons, but do so primarily because national laws are permissive and parties invite or encourage them to do so. 1 But what is the nature of such involvement? Does it complement or impede the arbitration process? Is there a place for any court involvement at all in the system referred to as international arbitration?
The aim of this Article is to discuss these issues. First, this Article will discuss the fundamental characteristics of international arbitration as it co-exists with national courts. Next, this Article will survey the different stages of national court involvement in the international arbitration process and the forms of court involvement.
Further, this Article will analyze court awarded injunctions that act to support of the international arbitration process. Lastly, this Article will conclude with an assessment of whether court involvement is helpful to the international arbitration process.
I. FUNDAMENTAL CHARACTERISTICS OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION
There are four essential characteristics of international arbitration. First, international arbitration has an autonomous character and exists in a domain independent of and separate from national laws and jurisdictions.
2 Arbitration does not, as some have suggested, operate solely on the basis of contract, or from the relinquishment of jurisdictional control by states, or even a combination of these two things. Instead, arbitration is an autonomous system with a life of its own that inhabits a domain wholly outside any system of national law. 3 Access to the autonomous domain of international arbitration is obtained through contract and the relinquishment of rights by national courts. However, once entered, and subject to controls as discussed later, arbitration exists in its own rarefied domain.
Secondly, by their choice of arbitration parties have expressed a positive selection of an alternative dispute resolution system. 4 This is so even when national law has been chosen as the substantive law of the contract or the curial law of the arbitration. More specifically, the parties have intentionally and expressly rejected the jurisdiction of those courts. Parties make this choice for various reasons, such as the national courts' being unacceptable, unsuitable, or inappropriate in the circumstances of the case. 5 Regardless of their reasons, the parties have agreed the courts should take a back seat. The question is how far back the courts should be and when the courts should come forward.
Third, except in rare circumstances, the arbitral tribunal has primary responsibility for resolving all matters relating to the settlement of the dispute between the parties. 6 Through the principle of "separability," the agreement to arbitrate can survive even where (2) national laws are required to support the arbitration process during the arbitration; 11 and (3) international arbitration has established certain fundamental standards that require policing at the national level.
12 These standards are recognized by the international community and reflected in international instruments, international public policy and due process. 11. See id. art. II, § 3 (stating that the court of the contracting state shall, in the case of parties who have signed an agreement and at the request of one of the parties, refer disputes to arbitration).
12. See Park, supra note 9, at 23 (explaining that an arbitrator must bow to some of the "mandatory norms of the country in which he sits").
13. See, e.g., id. at 28 (discussing the nature of enforcement and the effect that the New York Convention has on the relationship of arbitration to the nation in which it occurs).
In this overall scheme international arbitration can be envisaged as a giant squid which seeks nourishment from the murky oceanic world where the domain of international arbitration and national jurisdiction meet. One might therefore speak of the international arbitration process as stretching its tentacles down from the domain of international arbitration to the national legal systems to forage for legitimacy, support, recognition, and effectiveness.
II. FORMS OF COURT INVOLVEMENT
With these four characteristics as the backdrop, this Section will discuss the most common forms of court involvement with international arbitration. Before doing that, however, it is appropriate to remember the requirements under the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the "New York Convention"), which has now been ratified by 144 countries.
14 The Convention provides that: (1) each contracting state must "recognize an agreement in writing under which the parties undertake to submit to arbitration . . . concerning a subject matter capable of settlement by arbitration"; 15 (2) courts of contracting states, when dealing with a case in which there is a valid arbitration agreement, must "at the request of one of the parties, refer the parties to arbitration, unless it finds that the said agreement is null and void, inoperative, or incapable of being performed"; 16 (3) each Contracting State, when dealing with a case in which there is a valid arbitration agreement, must "recognize arbitral awards as binding and enforce them in accordance with the rules of . . . the territory where the award is relied upon, under the conditions laid down in" the Convention;
17 and (4) the court at the place where enforcement of an award is sought can refuse recognition and/or enforcement of such an award only in specified limited circumstances. These limited circumstances include the invalidity of the arbitration agreement, lack of notice of the arbitration, that the subject matter of the award 14 is not a difference contemplated by the arbitration agreement, or that the composition of the tribunal or the procedure followed was contrary to that agreed by the parties.
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A close reading of Articles II, III and V of the New York Convention reveals two crucial principles of international arbitration. First, court involvement is required as support for the arbitral process and for recognition and enforcement of arbitration agreements and awards but nothing else. 19 In this context, any other national court involvement in the international arbitration process is arguably illegitimate, including actions to protect nationals of a particular country, to intimidate arbitrators, to protect national commercial or jurisdictional interests, or simply because the court thinks that it is better suited than an arbitral tribunal to decide on an issue.
Second, the only courts that should become involved in the arbitration process are those at the seat of arbitration or the place of enforcement. 20 It is here, as will be seen later in the context of the use of anti-suit or anti-arbitration injunctions, that the intervention of the courts conflicts with these accepted international rules. In addition to these two principles, it is also widely accepted that there is a hierarchy between the court of the seat of arbitration and the court of enforcement. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently expressed this in the following terms: "Under the [ contains similar provisions to the New York Convention but is more expansive as to the role of the courts. 23 Its approach is clearly stated in its early provisions: Article 5 provides that "no court shall intervene except where so provided in this Law," 24 and Article 6 designates just three areas for court involvement in an arbitration within its jurisdiction. 25 First, it provides for assistance with the appointment of a tribunal: Articles 11.3, 11.4, 13 and 14 provide for court assistance to ensure the proper appointment of a tribunal where the appointing mechanism fails, there is a challenge to the independence and impartiality of an arbitrator, or an arbitrator becomes incapable of performing his duties. 26 Second, it allows review of issues of fundamental jurisdiction: Article 16.3 gives the court the power to revisit issues concerning the tribunal's jurisdiction in light of the terms of the arbitration agreement. 27 Third, it allows parties to challenge an award: Article 34 provides for those exceptional conditions where the court may set aside or overturn an award. 28 Like the New York Convention, these are limited to As is evident from the thumbnail overview of the New York Convention and the UNCITRAL Model Law above, there are four stages when courts are most likely to become involved with the arbitration process: (1) prior to the establishment of a tribunal; (2) at the commencement of the arbitration; (3) during the arbitration process; and (4) during the enforcement stage.
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A. PRIOR TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A TRIBUNAL
Prior to the establishment of the arbitral tribunal, courts become involved where a party initiates proceedings to challenge the validity of the arbitration agreement; where one party institutes court proceedings despite, and perhaps with the intention of avoiding, the agreement to arbitrate; and where one party needs urgent protection that cannot await the appointment of the tribunal.
In all cases, the court's duty is to uphold the agreement to arbitrate. In the first and second cases, the court must deal with this in accordance with the New York Convention, i.e., refer the matter to arbitration if there is a valid arbitration agreement. 31 31. See New York Convention, supra note 10, art. II, § 1 (mandating that signatory states recognize "agreement [s] in writing under which the parties undertake to submit to arbitration all or any differences which have arisen").
tribunal has done so. 32 In the third case, the court fills the gap until the tribunal is established to protect the status quo. Many national laws allow, as does the UNCITRAL Model Law by omission, for courts to grant interim relief before the tribunal has been established or where the applicable arbitration rules do not allow arbitrators to grant interim measures of protection. 33 Most would agree that, at this stage, national court intervention is not disruptive, and may be beneficial to the arbitration proceedings. 34 Exceptionally, this might not be the case where the requested measures can be postponed, or the court effectively has to pre-empt the decision of the tribunal.
B. AT THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE ARBITRATION
Court intervention at the commencement of an arbitration generally involves assisting with the appointment of and challenges to arbitrators. As is reflected in the UNCITRAL Model Law and in most national laws, the court here uses its authority to give effect to the parties' agreement by establishing an appropriate tribunal to take over and deal with the dispute between the parties where the prescribed appointment mechanism does not work.
C. DURING THE ARBITRATION PROCESS
Court involvement during the arbitration process comes in many forms and is rarely dealt with in arbitration statutes. Properly exercised, this involves courts' making procedural orders that cannot be ordered or enforced by arbitrators, or orders for maintaining the status quo. These measures are generally helpful. 36 There are also Finally after an award has been rendered, the courts may become involved in two places: (1) at the place of arbitration, i.e., when a party challenges and seeks to set aside the award, or lodges an appeal against the award under the applicable arbitral law or regime; or (2) at the place of enforcement, where the successful party seeks the recognition and enforcement of the award.
There is one word of caution in all this. Although the principles as outlined above are normal and desirable, one should be aware that when a national court is asked to deal with any of these issues, it is in its simplest form a negation of the arbitration agreement. More particularly, a national court will inevitably and unsurprisingly approach and determine these issues in accordance with its own national law and procedures. More controversially it may also be influenced by its parochial, legal, cultural, economic, and political system.
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IV. INJUNCTIONS INVOLVING ARBITRATION
Granting injunctions is one area of court involvement which cuts across every stage of the arbitration process and gives rise to a number of practical and conceptual difficulties. 39 Schwebel described it as "one of the gravest problems of contemporary international commercial arbitration." 40 Injunctions come in all shapes and sizes. The focus here will be on injunctions that seek to undermine or block arbitration proceedings, i.e., antiarbitration injunctions, and those that encourage and enforce arbitration proceedings, i.e., anti-suit injunctions and pro-arbitration injunctions.
A. ANTI-ARBITRATION INJUNCTIONS
Anti-arbitration injunctions are used either before arbitration has commenced to prevent the tribunal from being established or after proceedings have begun to stop an arbitration in its tracks. Injunctions restraining the conduct of arbitration proceedings are in general-and should only be-granted where it is absolutely clear that the arbitration proceedings have been wrongly brought. 41 These injunctions can be directed against the parties alone, but also against the arbitrators if the court has jurisdiction over them.
In general, there is a distinction between common law countries and civil law countries when it comes to the power to award antiarbitration injunctions. Common law countries tend to be permissive and therefore more willing to become involved, while civil law countries tend to be restrictive and are reluctant to interfere in the process chosen by the parties. 42 This is not surprising as-at the risk (1) The High Court may by order (whether interlocutory or final) grant an injunction or appoint a receiver in all cases in which it appears to the court to be just and convenient to do so.
(2) Any such order may be made either unconditionally or on such terms and conditions as the court thinks just. 44 These provisions were applied in Welex A.G. v. Rosa Maritime Ltd. ("The Epsilon Rosa") where an anti-suit injunction was issued restraining Welex from proceeding with court proceedings in Poland brought in violation of an arbitration agreement. 45 The Court of Appeal held that even though the Arbitration Act did not give an express power to the High Court to grant the injunction, it has a general power to grant permanent anti-suit injunctions "in all cases in which it appears to the Court to be just and convenient to do so." expressly that disputes should be resolved by the sole arbitrator, with his seat in Switzerland and governed by Swiss law, 51 and consequently, any issues as to the validity of the arbitration agreement were required "to be resolved in Switzerland according to Swiss law."
52 This was not a matter for the English courts.
In J. Jarvis & Sons Ltd. v. Blue Circle Dartford Estates Ltd., Jarvis sought a stay of arbitration proceedings on the grounds that concurrent proceedings would be in place, that existing proceedings may result in inconsistent findings, and that the arbitration proceedings serve no useful purpose. 53 The court found that it had jurisdiction to entertain the application but noted that an order would only be made in exceptional circumstances. 54 In reaching its decision refusing an injunction, the court noted the refusal of the Commercial Court to grant an anti-arbitration injunction in the recent cases of Intermet FCZO v. Ansol Ltd. and Elektrim S.A. v. Vivendi, and that, since January 31, 1997, there were apparently no instances of the Commercial Court's granting an injunction to halt an arbitration.
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The court further noted that: (1) it had jurisdiction to make an order under section 37 of the Supreme Court Act of 1991; (2) the discretion can be exercised if (a) the injunction does not cause injustice, and (b) "the continuance of the arbitration would be oppressive, vexatious, unconscionable or an abuse of process"; (3) the discretion should be used sparingly given the principles of the Arbitration Act; and (4) delay would be material, if not fatal, to the application.
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A major concern with the possibility of several conflicting jurisdictions is the risk of inconsistent findings. In this respect, the court stated: Once those proceedings [i.e., court proceedings brought by a party against Jarvis] have been launched, there will be concurrent proceedings both in court and before the Arbitrator concerning the same subject matter. This carries the risk of inconsistent findings. Costs will be duplicated. Both Jarvis and Blue Circle will be fighting on two fronts before different tribunals about the same subject matter. All of those observations are true, but they do not mean that the arbitration is vexatious. It is an inevitable consequence of the mandatory language of section 9 of [the] Arbitration Act that from time to time there will be concurrent proceedings in court and before an arbitrator.
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In Elektrim S.A. v. Vivendi Universal S.A., one of the two cases addressed in Jarvis, the claimant sought an injunction to restrain the respondents from pursuing an arbitration being conducted before the London Court of International Arbitration ("LCIA"). 58 The claimant and the first and second respondents were shareholders in a joint venture company which controlled the Polish company which ran the largest mobile telecommunications network in Poland. A dispute had arisen between the claimant and respondent under an investment agreement to which they were parties and under which the second respondent had begun an arbitration in London under the rules of the LCIA.
There had been other arbitrations and court proceedings between the parties. A draft agreement to settle the ownership of the shares in the Polish company and all outstanding proceedings was produced. It provided for disputes to be submitted to arbitration in Geneva in accordance with the International Chamber of Commerce rules. The second respondent claimed that a legally binding settlement had been concluded and began an arbitration in Geneva claiming a declaration that the settlement agreement was binding and enforceable. To avoid the risk of several proceedings and possibly inconsistent and conflicting decisions, the claimant sought an injunction to restrain the LCIA arbitration until after the final determination of the Geneva arbitration. The London arbitrators had refused the claimant's request that they stay the arbitration. In refusing the injunction to restrain the LCIA proceedings, the court reasoned, first, that under the Arbitration Act, "the scope for the court to intervene by injunction before an award" had been "very limited." 59 Second, neither the existence of the London arbitration nor its prosecution breached any legal or equitable right of the claimant. The parties had agreed to resolve disputes under the investment agreement by LCIA arbitration. 60 The pursuit of two arbitrations with different subject-matters was not vexatious or oppressive. Third, even if the claimant could establish that some right had been infringed or was threatened by the continuation of the London arbitration or that continuation of the arbitration was otherwise vexatious or oppressive, the court would not grant an injunction under section 37 of the 1981 Act because that would be contrary to the parties' agreement to refer disputes under the investment agreement to LCIA arbitration. 61 The arbitrators had on three occasions refused to stay the LCIA arbitration and the court had "no express power under the Arbitration Act to review or overrule those procedural decisions in advance of an award by the LCIA arbitrators."
62 To do so under section 37 of the Supreme Court Act "would undermine the principles of the 1996 Act."
63 Fourth, in the circumstances of the case, the court thought it would be unjust to restrain the LCIA arbitration. 64 The problem was due to two arbitration agreements on two separate issues: the second respondent's claim that the settlement agreement was valid in the Geneva arbitration and the claimant's claim in the LCIA under the investment agreement. It was inevitable that there would be a multiplicity of proceedings.
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In Intermet FCZO v. Ansol Ltd., the other case referred to in Jarvis, the applicant (X) applied for an interim injunction to restrain the respondents (Y) from proceeding with arbitration. 66 money to X, who had defaulted on the repayments and owed a very large sum. In order to postpone repayment, X had agreed to transfer to Y the sole share in a company that allegedly owned a valuable property in Moscow. However, X failed to repay the debt and the company was said to be worthless. Y claimed that, at the time the agreement was made, X knew that the company did not own the property, so that Y was "deceived into believing that [the company] had the rights to and interest in" the property that it did not have and was "induced to enter the [agreement] on that basis." 67 Pursuant to the arbitration clause in the agreement, Y began arbitration proceedings and claimed damages for breach of the contractual obligations set out in the agreement. Several months later, Y also began a court action to seek further damages. However, in that action they sought no damages for breach of the agreement or any claim in contract other than for the repayment of the loan, and three months afterwards, X applied for an injunction to restrain Y from continuing with the arbitration.
68 X submitted that the same contractual claims were advanced against it in the arbitration as in the court proceedings and that it would be severely unjust and prejudicial to X if the arbitration proceedings were allowed to continue, whereas no injustice would be caused to Y by a stay of the arbitration.
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Mrs. Justice Gloster found that the application for the injunction was far too late. 70 X should have applied for it immediately after the beginning of the court proceedings. In seeking to have the tribunal determine the issues that had been raised in the arbitration proceedings, Y had not behaved in a manner that was oppressive or unconscionable. Y had never sought any finding in the arbitration that X was a party to any fraudulent conspiracy or that X had made any fraudulent misrepresentations at any time. 71 In effect, the arbitral claims were contractual, whereas the court proceedings dealt with issues of fraud. Moreover, Y had not pursued any claims based upon any alleged fraud in the arbitration. 72 enforcement of any award they might obtain and would be a waste of the enormous costs that Y had already incurred in the arbitration. 73 Accordingly, and in the light of the undertakings, it would be wholly inappropriate to grant any injunction. 74 
The United States 75
It is well established that U.S. courts have a general power to grant anti-suit injunctions.
76 Before a court may grant an anti-suit injunction, the following three threshold requirements must be met: (1) the court issuing the injunction must have jurisdiction; (2) the parties to both proceedings must be the same; and (3) the decision in the action before the court issuing the injunction must dispose of the foreign court proceedings. These threshold requirements are sometimes referred to as the "China Trade Test."
77 Once these requirements have been met, the standard applied for issuing an antisuit injunction varies depending on the court before which the injunction is sought. 78 There appear to be different approaches among the U.S. Courts of Appeal to dealing with this question which are not explored here. 78. See Kaepa, 76 F.3d at 626 (noting that although U.S. courts possess the ability to allow anti-suit injunctions, the various circuits disagree on which legal standard to apply concerning injunctive relief).
79. Compare Kaepa, 76 F.3d at 627 (applying a more liberal standard in the consideration of granting anti-suit injunctions, declining to require a district court to entertain "omnipotent" notions of comity), and Allendale Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bull Data Sys., Inc., 10 F.3d 425, 431 (7th Cir. 1993) (employing a "lax" standard of considering the effect of injunction on international comity, but requiring some empirical evidence that the issuance of an injunction would impair international comity in the particular case), with Quaak v. Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler Bedrijfsrevisoren, 361 F.3d 11, 17 (1st Cir. 2004) (noting the importance of considering international comity in the calculation regarding imposition of an injunction, recognizing that the issuance of an anti-suit injunction would Suffice it to say, in each particular case the onus is on persuading the court that in light of "the totality of the circumstances," including the nature of the actions and the policies at stake, the case is suitable for the anti-suit injunction being sought. 
Switzerland
By contrast, anti-arbitration injunctions seem to be incompatible with the Swiss legal system. Indeed, in Air (PTY) Ltd. v. International Air Transport Ass'n, 81 the Court of First Instance of the Canton of Geneva ruled that anti-suit injunctions, including antiarbitration injunctions, are contrary to the Swiss legal system. 82 In particular, anti-arbitration injunctions have been found to contradict the principle of competence-competence, which is a well-established principle in Swiss law. According to the court:
[A]s a matter of Swiss law there is no such thing as a "judicial tutelage" of the courts over arbitrators; quite to the contrary, Swiss law fully implements the principle of "Kompetenz-Kompetenz" both in its positive effect . . . and its negative effect . . . . The jurisdiction of a court to determine whether an arbitration agreement is valid-which cannot in any event lead to an anti-suit injunction-exists only when the arbitration agreement is relied upon as a defence before the court. Switzerland must apply the principles of lis pendens and res judicata in order to avoid contradictory awards. 85 The suggestion therefore is that contradictory judgments are avoided, not by preventing the rendering of foreign judgments, but by recognizing or enforcing such judgments. 86 
France
It seems possible for French courts to order a party to halt its proceedings before a foreign court. 87 However, Article 1458 of the French New Code of Civil Procedure ("NCPC"), which applies to both domestic and international arbitrations, provides that if a dispute pending before an arbitral tribunal on the basis of an arbitration agreement is brought before a state court, it shall declare itself incompetent unless the arbitration agreement is manifestly null and void, but this issue must be raised by the party. 88 The court will then leave it to the tribunal to determine the validity and extent of the arbitration.
The effect of Article 1458 of the NCCP is to ensure that the arbitral tribunal is the first to decide the issue of its jurisdiction prior to any court or other judicial authority. 89 The role of the courts is limited to the review of the arbitrator's award on jurisdiction at the annulment or enforcement stage. French courts will generally not rule on the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement until the arbitral tribunal has reached its own decision. 90 
Sweden
The general practice in Sweden is for courts not to interfere with the arbitration process in line with its philosophy that the basis of arbitration is, and has always been, that of freedom of contract, trust in the arbitrators, and recognition of the advantages of a single, privately administered dispute settlement mechanism.
91 However, the one exception to this rule relates to the validity of the arbitration agreement, and despite recognition of the right of arbitrators to rule on their own jurisdiction, this does not preclude a Swedish court from doing so at the same time if requested by one of the parties. 
Should National Courts Grant Anti-Arbitration Injunctions?
There will hardly ever be a justification for a national court to grant an anti-arbitration injunction of the kind discussed. The following observations can be made in support of this position. First, the principles of competence-competence, separability, and party autonomy all point to the overarching principle that a decision as to whether an arbitration should continue should be left first and foremost to the arbitration tribunal. injunctions. Article 5 states simply: "In matters governed by this Law, no court shall intervene except where so provided in this Law." 94 Third, only the court of the seat of arbitration has jurisdiction with respect to an arbitration and should exercise this only in very limited circumstances. There can be little justification for a court at the seat of an arbitration preventing challenge of an award by injunction.
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Recognition and enforcement must be the preserve of the enforcing court. No court other than the court at the seat of arbitration has a right to interfere. Fourth, in light of the above, there can be no basis for any court to grant an injunction on grounds of comity, balance of convenience, or even whether an arbitration appears to be vexatious or oppressive. Instead, the only concern of the court must be the validity of the arbitration agreement itself.
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Fifth, although it is argued that anti-arbitration injunctions do sometimes serve just ends, this may often be a lengthy and costly process leading to parallel litigation in various fora. This can be illustrated by the case of General Electric Co. v. Deutz AG, 97 where a U.S. court granted an anti-arbitration injunction to stop an arbitration abroad. The underlying contract provided for ICC arbitration in London and was concluded between General Electric and a third company. Deutz subsequently joined in this agreement. A dispute arose, and General Electric commenced court proceedings before a U.S. court against Deutz, alleging breach of contract. Deutz responded by requesting an order to compel General Electric to arbitration in conformity with the arbitration agreement, and it initiated an ICC arbitration. In response, General Electric requested an anti-arbitration injunction enjoining Deutz from proceeding with the ICC arbitration in London.
The court granted the anti-arbitration injunction based on its general power to grant injunctive relief. It held that to respect the international nature of the arbitration, the court should decline to 94 follow the restrictive standard applicable to cases of anti-suit injunctions against foreign court proceedings. 98 The two conditions for the granting of an anti-arbitration injunction under the restrictive standard existed: the ICC arbitration commenced by Deutz threatened the jurisdiction of the U.S. forum, and, by commencing arbitration proceedings, Deutz was evading strong U.S. public policies. 99 However, on appeal, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the order granting the injunction, finding that the district court failed to follow the more restrictive approach to granting antiarbitration injunctions and give due regard to principles of international comity.
100 Thus, the parties to this dispute spent much of their time and resources on legal proceedings that did not resolve their dispute.
Sixth, abuse is most likely when a party approaches its own court for assistance, that court not being the seat of the arbitration. According to the ICC, in 2006, of the thirty-one cases where antiarbitration injunctions were granted, twenty-five were granted by courts of the nationality of one of the parties.
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Matters become particularly suspicious when one party is a state or state entity, which seeks and obtains an injunction from its own state court. There have been several unfortunate cases of this kind. Himpurna California Energy v. Republic of Indonesia is the infamous case of an Indonesian court issuing an anti-arbitration injunction to stop an arbitral tribunal from rendering an award against an Indonesian state-owned corporation. 102 The case arose from various contracts for the construction and operation of an electrical generation plant in Indonesia. The contracts provided for ad hoc arbitration with the seat in Jakarta under the UNCITRAL dispute arose out of a Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) concluded between HUBCO, a company incorporated in Pakistan, and WAPDA, a Pakistani state-owned company. The Supreme Court of Pakistan had to decide which of two anti-suit injunctions to uphold. HUBCO had obtained an injunction restraining WAPDA from seeking resolution of the dispute through any other means except through ICC arbitration; WAPDA obtained an injunction restraining HUBCO from pursuing the arbitration. 107 The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the only question to be decided was whether the dispute was arbitrable.
108 By majority, it decided the matters raised were not arbitrable as they involved matters of criminality.
109 Thus, it decided that HUBCO must desist from pursuing the London arbitration and bring its claim before the courts of Pakistan. It is worth noting that tribunals refused to be intimidated and continued their work in most of the cases referred to above when an anti-arbitration order was made.
Seventh, even if an award might eventually be set aside or enforcement refused by a competent court, the anti-arbitration injunction negates the process by which this is supposed to take place. 114 These points are well illustrated in English court decision in Albon v. Naza Motor Trading. 115 In that case, the claimant applied for an injunction restraining the respondent from pursuing arbitration in Malaysia on the basis that there was an oral underlying agreement that was subject to English law. Although there was a written joint venture agreement containing an arbitration clause and signed by the parties in Malaysia, and subject to Malaysian law, the claimant claimed its signature had been forged. The High Court issued an injunction to stop the proceedings in Malaysia until the matter of the authenticity of the signature had been determined by the English court. The judge claimed jurisdiction on the basis that (1) the oral contract was made under English law; (2) the respondent had applied for stay of the English court proceedings in favor of arbitration proceedings and in so doing had submitted to the English court; and (3) if the injunction was not granted, the instant proceedings would become duplicative.
V. ANTI-SUIT INJUNCTIONS
Anti-suit injunctions operating in personam are aimed at preventing or restraining proceedings in courts in breach of an arbitration agreement. Such injunctions are typical when there are concurrent proceedings in another jurisdiction. The anti-suit injunction is not directed at the foreign court but at the defendant who has promised, through the arbitration clause, not to bring foreign proceedings. There are three important points to be made in relation to anti-suit injunctions: first, the importance of the anti-suit injunction to the supervisory role of the national courts is by and large now widely recognized.
118 These injunctions may have a vital role to play in the hands of national courts at the seat of arbitration in its supervisory role over the arbitration process. 119 However, the hurdles to be surmounted before awarding an anti-suit injunction differ from country to country.
For example, in England, the Court of Appeal confirmed that the jurisdiction to grant an injunction is discretionary and held that English courts should feel no diffidence in granting injunctions provided they are "sought promptly and before the foreign proceedings are too far advanced." 120 In Aggeliki Charis Compania Maritima S.A. v. Pagnan S.P.A., the Court of Appeal upheld an injunction preventing a party to an arbitration in England from proceeding with a claim before the courts in Italy. 121 Similarly, in Starlight Shipping Co. v. Tai Ping Insurance Co., the English court granted a ship owner an anti-suit injunction to restrain Chinese proceedings commenced in breach of an arbitration clause found in a bill of lading. 122 The defendants claimed that they were not bound to the arbitration agreement as a matter of Chinese law. that an injunction barring a foreign action was proper if the simultaneous prosecution of an action would result in "inequitable hardship" and "tend to frustrate and delay the speedy and efficient determination of the cause." . . . The focus of the inquiry is whether there exists a need to prevent vexatious or oppressive litigation. . . . In light of the strong federal policy favoring arbitration, the court finds that Plaintiffs would be irreparably harmed if Baer were permitted to continue litigating in Ecuador while the same claims were being arbitrated. Therefore, the court [grants] Plaintiffs' application for injunction. 125 It would appear that the approach of the U.S. courts is stricter than the English courts. An important criterion for the granting of the injunction in the United States is "irreparable harm." This requirement was defined by the U.
S. District Court for the Southern District of New York in Empresa Generadora de Electricidad ITABO v. Corporacio Dominicana de Empresas Electricas Estatales (CDEEE).
126 In this case, ITABO, a private company incorporated in the Dominican Republic, requested the court to compel CDEEE, a company owned by the Dominican Republic, to ICC arbitration in New York in conformity with the arbitration agreement contained in ITABO's bylaws. It also requested an anti-suit injunction to enjoin CDEEE from continuing with litigation in the Dominican courts. The court denied both requests. Concerning the anti-suit injunction, the court held that " ITABO whether, as IPOC argued, the Bermuda court must in addition have some "sufficient interest" before it can grant an anti-suit injunction. The Bermuda Court of Appeal rejected the argument that only the court at the seat of the arbitration can issue an anti-suit injunction and held personal jurisdiction to be sufficient. 133 While the proarbitration decision is welcome, it is strongly arguable that courts taking jurisdiction on similar or other grounds would be unjustifiably interfering with the arbitration process. 134 As argued above, in the normal course, only the court at the seat of arbitration should interfere with the arbitral process, and even then only rarely.
The second point is that national courts might arguably use the anti-suit injunction whenever they consider it necessary to protect the parties' agreement to arbitrate. 135 In this regard, anti-suit injunctions in the arbitration context are inherently different from injunctions awarded in other contexts. This difference has mostly to do with the nature of arbitration itself. Other types of injunctions are issued to correct or alter otherwise wrongful or unconscionable conduct. In anti-suit injunctions, the court's concern ought to be to restrain a party from attempting to circumvent its promise to arbitrate. 136 In this regard, the court ought not to be concerned by issues of oppressive or vexatious conduct, or be overly sensitive to questions of comity.
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The injunction bites only because the parties have agreed to have their dispute resolved via a mechanism that transcends any individual jurisdiction.
138 Courts ought to resist muddying the waters with any other concerns. is to have sole jurisdiction over any dispute, the true role of comity is to ensure that the parties' agreement is respected."
142 Lord Justice Longmore further added to these justifications some practical observations, namely that the benefit of a court's exercising its discretion to award an injunction at an early stage of an arbitration where matters are straightforward is that it will prevent matters from being heard twice, first before arbitrators and then again later before courts. 143 Further, by ordering anti-suit injunctions, the applying party is able to benefit from contempt of court proceedings.
A. SHOULD ARBITRATION CLAUSES BE TREATED DIFFERENTLY FROM JURISDICTION CLAUSES?
One conceptual problem closely related to this area of discussion, and which has the potential for serious practical ramifications, is whether arbitration clauses ought to be treated differently from standard jurisdiction clauses. This is a matter that has recently exercised the European courts. As a general rule, regulation 44/2001 (the "Brussels Regulation") sets out the rules of jurisdiction that apply to the European Union. 145 Under Article 27 of the Brussels It is clear from European case law that this principle applies even where there is a choice of jurisdiction clause. 149 However, Article 1(2)(d) expressly excludes arbitration from the scope of the Brussels Regulation. The issue, though, is whether the term arbitration includes all matters relating to arbitration, such as the validity of the arbitration agreement, or whether it relates only to procedural matters and enforcement issues. Article 1(2)(d) of the Brussels Regulation and its forerunner, Article 1(4) of the Brussels Convention, were purposely left vague in this regard. an insured commenced London arbitration to recover excess losses from a collision. 151 During the course of the arbitration, the owners of the vessels became aware that the insurers had commenced court proceedings against them in Italy. The English High Court granted an injunction stopping the insurers from continuing with the Italian proceedings on the grounds that: (1) under English law the duty to arbitrate was an inseparable part of the subject matter transferred; (2) the insurer was bound by the arbitration clause; and (3) the attitude of the foreign court (the Italian court paid no attention to the injunction) was irrelevant where an arbitration clause was concerned. The House of Lords considered whether it is "consistent with EC Regulation 44/2001 for a court of a Member State to make an order to restrain a person from commencing or continuing proceedings in another Member State" where there is a valid arbitration agreement. 152 The Lords considered that this was a matter that should be referred to the ECJ. 153 However, in making the reference, the Lords expressed their views, which are not binding on any court, but which indicated the way the House of Lords hoped (unsuccessfully) this issue would be resolved. 154 Lord Hoffman, for example, opined that an order for restraint where a party had started proceedings contrary to an arbitration clause was not contrary to the Brussels regulation:
The basic principles by which the [Brussels] regulation allocates jurisdiction, giving priority (subject to exceptions) to the domicile of the defendant, are entirely unsuited to arbitration, in which the situs and governing law are generally chosen by the parties on grounds of neutrality, availability of legal services and the unobtrusive effectiveness of the supervisory jurisdiction. There is no set of uniform Community rules which Member States can or must trust each other to apply. Lord Hoffman's reasoning is correct, and it would be quite wrong for the ECJ to allow arbitration agreements to be undermined by a party simply by starting proceedings in a court of the European Union. No matter what the wording of the Brussels Regulation was intended to mean, there are very good reasons for courts to treat jurisdiction clauses differently from arbitration clauses. First, jurisdiction clauses serve to allocate jurisdiction between national regimes; the national regimes therefore remain in play. In contrast, an agreement to arbitrate takes the dispute out of any national framework and places it within a self-contained regime. 156 Secondly, in the arbitration context, it is not a matter of a contest between rival national jurisdictions. Instead, any powers the courts have are supervisory. 157 Proper jurisdiction lies with the arbitral tribunal. This is vital because the arbitral tribunal is not a party to any convention or agreement relating to jurisdiction and has no need to respect comity. 158 In fact, the sole duty of the tribunal is to carry out the terms of the arbitration agreement. In the normal course, arbitration proceedings will not be stayed while national court proceedings are pending. 156. But cf. Brekoulakis, supra note 150, at 342 (arguing as between arbitration and jurisdiction agreements, arbitration agreements have a more favorable status because they are better regulated and more favored by the courts).
157. Cf. id. at 343 (finding the "legal framework" of arbitration "establishes a duty for the national courts to enforce an arbitration agreement whenever they are seized of a dispute covered by the scope of the arbitration agreement"). This decision bars English courts from granting anti-suit injunctions to restrain a party bringing proceedings in a court of a European Member State in breach of an arbitration agreement. However, this decision is not necessarily anti-arbitration. It leaves it to each national court in which proceedings are brought to decide for itself whether the arbitration agreement is valid and binding and covers the specific dispute between the parties. There is of course a risk of parallel proceedings, additional costs, the possibility for a financially stronger party to exert pressure on a weaker party by additional proceedings and even conflicting decisions. It will be for the national courts to try and keep such abuses to a minimum by applying Article II of the New York Convention strictly.
One must recognize that it is possible for national courts to misuse anti-suit injunctions, but this was not a reason for the ECJ decision. 162 The greatest risk of such misuse appears to be when they are granted after the arbitration award, that is, where they are employed by courts of the seat of an arbitration to protect an arbitration award that has already been made. There are several recent examples of instances where anti-suit injunctions of this type have been sought. In Noble Assurance Co. v. Gerling-Konzern General Insurance Co., the English court exercised its discretion to grant an anti-suit injunction to prevent a defendant to arbitration proceedings from continuing an action commenced in a different 161. Id. [35] . 162. See Ibeto Petrochemical Indus. Ltd. v. M/T Beffen, 475 F.3d 56, 65 (2d Cir. 2007) (cautioning that "due regard for principles of international comity and reciprocity require a delicate touch in the issuance of anti-foreign suit injunctions, that such injunctions should be used sparingly, and that the pendency of a suit involving the same parties and same issues does not alone form the basis for such an injunction"). [24:489 jurisdiction designed to nullify the arbitration award made against it. 163 In C v. D, the English court held that an insured was entitled to an anti-suit injunction preventing the insurer from challenging a London arbitration award in the United States because the attempt to invoke the jurisdiction of another court was a breach of the contract to arbitrate. 164 The insurer threatened to apply to the New York courts on the ground that the award was "a manifest disregard of New York law." 165 This constituted a threatened breach of the arbitration agreement and had to be stopped. 166 Mr Justice Cooke found that the agreement dealing with the seat of arbitration was "akin to an agreement to an exclusive jurisdiction clause," and that such agreement included an agreement that the courts at the seat of arbitration had supervisory powers. 167 Further, by agreeing to the seat of arbitration, the parties agreed that any challenges to an award were "to be made only in the courts of the place designated as the seat of arbitration." 168 In this regard, the choice of New York as the Governing Law was found to be irrelevant when it came to challenging the arbitration award. To take a step that would "negate the whole framework in which the arbitration took place" was vexatious, oppressive, unconscionable, and an abuse of process. 169 C was therefore entitled to injunctive relief.
In KBC v. Pertamina, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld an injunction to prevent Pertamina from taking proceedings in the Cayman Islands to recover moneys paid out under an award against it on the pretext that the award was procured by fraud. 170 This infamous, longstanding, and multi-faceted litigation involved proceedings in different jurisdictions, including an arbitration which found against Pertamina. The Court of Appeals held that in this case, an anti-suit injunction was necessary "to prevent Pertamina from engaging in litigation that would tend to undermine the regime established by the Convention for recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards." 171 The U.S. Court of Appeals recognized the importance of comity, the importance of respect for the capacities of foreign transnational tribunals, and the need to be sensitive to the needs of the international commercial system for predictability in the resolution of disputes. However, here there was no mere disagreement with the way the arbitral award had been enforced. This would not justify an injunction. Instead, where there was a concerted effort to undermine the arbitral process the court found that "federal courts are not obliged to sit by idly when a party engages in proceedings that undermine the regime governing enforcement of foreign arbitral awards established by the Convention."
172 The appeal against the injunction was dismissed and the injunction allowed.
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In a recent Peruvian case, an injunction was awarded by the Civil Court of Lima to preserve an award granted under the 1996 Peruvian Arbitration Act. 174 The original award obliged the Peruvian mining companies to transfer the rights in a gold and silver mine to Sulliden and its Peruvian subsidiary. This injunction, however, was released as the court was persuaded that the official who signed the contract containing the arbitration lacked the required authority. 175 Injunctions granted by courts other than at the seat of the arbitration or the place of enforcement of an award against foreign proceedings in connection with an award, although perhaps on occasion justified on grounds of justice, will often be counter to the fundamental principles of international arbitration. First, the seat of arbitration has a supervisory role only until an award has been made. 176 It has no duty to offer to protect an award as a matter of [24:489 right. The proper way to challenge an award is at the courts of the seat of arbitration or to resist enforcement at the place of enforcement, and this is only on limited grounds. 177 The court at the seat of arbitration should not interfere with this process.
Secondly, the court of the place of enforcement has no duty or power to protect an arbitration award made in a foreign state. 178 Its duty is only to enforce an award in accordance with the New York Convention. A court seized with an action has the sole right to determine the legitimacy of that action and to decide on its own jurisdiction. Any other approach to those set out above cannot be justified in terms of the New York Convention and the autonomous nature of arbitration. It undermines trust between Convention states, raises issues of international comity and respect between nations, and opens the way to confusion and ultimately injustice. 179 
B. PRO-ARBITRATION ORDERS
Pro-arbitration orders are orders issued by national courts for specific performance of arbitration agreements. On their face these injunctions offer powerful support for the arbitration process in that they directly compel parties to undertake what they have already agreed upon. There are two important issues relating to courts' compelling arbitration. The first is whether orders compelling arbitration accord with the underlying principles of the international arbitration regime. The second issue is that if such orders are made, how far should they reach, and in particular, should courts be entitled to make orders against parties who are not on the face of the arbitration clause party to the arbitration agreement?
When Should Courts Compel Parties to Arbitrate?
This question is handled differently in different jurisdictions. The United States offers courts the greatest powers in terms of ordering specific performance. In the United States, an arbitration agreement can be enforced by a court order forcing a reluctant party to go to arbitration, and a party that does not follow the court's order will be in contempt of court. 180 Sections 4 and 206 of the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") allow a party aggrieved by the failure or refusal of a contracting party to arbitrate under a written arbitration agreement to seek an order directing that such party participate in the arbitration as agreed and that a party who ignores the order will be in contempt of court.
181 This compelling power applies even if the agreed-upon seat of the arbitration is outside the United States. It can have very important implications for default awards as too often parties decide for tactical reasons, which may assist in resisting enforcement, to refuse to participate in the arbitration despite the arbitration agreement. Id. § 4 (providing recourse for an aggrieved party "if the jury find that an agreement for arbitration was made in writing and that there is a default in proceeding thereunder, the court shall make an order summarily directing the parties to proceed with the arbitration in accordance with the terms thereof").
183. 369 F.3d 645, 652 (2d Cir. 2004) (affirming the judgment of the District Court in granting "GEMS-IT's motion to compel arbitration").
that an arbitration agreement exists and that one of the parties to this agreement is not in compliance with it, an order compelling arbitration without further proceedings may be issued.
184
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the anti-suit injunction and the imposition of sanctions, but remanded for reconsideration of the amount of the sanctions. The Second Circuit held that "[a]n anti-suit injunction against parallel litigation may be imposed only if: (A) the parties are the same in both matters, and (B) resolution of the case before the enjoining court is dispositive of the action to be enjoined." 185 The court found that "the district court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that the" defendant sufficiently met the two requirements.
186 Cases such as these take their steer from the U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., where the Court stated that a party that makes a bargain to arbitrate "should be held to it unless Congress itself has evinced an intention to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue."
187
Although pro-arbitration injunctions ought to appeal to those who support arbitration, there are good reasons to doubt whether they are beneficial to the arbitral process and/or accord with the core principles of arbitration practice. First, most national laws do not expressly allow courts to order parties to participate in arbitration proceedings even where there is a valid arbitration agreement. Rather the pressure is negative by refusing access to the court for matters covered by the arbitration agreement. 188 There is nothing in the New York Convention to suggest that a court has a duty to compel arbitration. Courts only have a duty to "refer" a party to arbitration. 189 The same language is used in the UNCITRAL Model Law. 190 The French NCPC requires a court to "decline jurisdiction"
184. Id. at 649 (concluding "that the anti-suit injunction was an appropriate measure to enforce and protect the judgment compelling arbitration").
185. 193 and section 9 of the English Arbitration Act of 1996 provides for a stay of court action.
194
The Channel Tunnel case is a prominent example where a court refused to order parties to arbitration but stayed the court proceedings in support of an arbitration agreement. court's inherent jurisdiction to stay proceedings brought before it in breach of an arbitration agreement. 196 Section 9 of the 1975 Arbitration Act further provided in its fourth paragraph that "the court shall grant a stay unless satisfied that the arbitration agreement is null and void, inoperative, or incapable of being performed." 197 The obligation to stay proceedings under section 9 applies even if the arbitral seat "is outside England and Wales or Northern Ireland or no seat has been designated or determined."
198 However, there is no power under the English Arbitration Act of 1996 for the courts to order a party to participate in an arbitration. Instead of actively enforcing an arbitration agreement, therefore, most national courts are similarly limited to a passive role, giving effect to the arbitration agreement only indirectly. 199 Secondly, the stay of court proceedings brought in breach of an arbitration agreement might be indirect but is nevertheless an efficient means of ensuring respect for an arbitration agreement while keeping court involvement to a minimum. It forces the claimant to go to arbitration, or at least is a major incentive, because the latter will have no other forum in which to bring his claim. 200 Thirdly, pro-arbitration agreements threaten the principle of competence-competence, in that arbitrators could feel inhibited to reach a decision different from that of a national court that has compelled the arbitration. 201 The assumption is that if a court has issued a pro-arbitration order it will have satisfied itself that there is a valid arbitration agreement. This of course is not the case: rather it is still for the arbitral tribunal to make the primary decision on jurisdiction.
Fourthly, pro-arbitration injunctions threaten the sanctity of party autonomy in that parties agree to go to arbitration on the basis that the party who believes itself to have been wronged initiates the arbitral process. The arbitral agreement is not founded on the power of the courts to force a recalcitrant party to settle its disputes through arbitration. If courts are prepared to compel parties to arbitrate their disputes, where does the process stop? Are courts justified in compelling a party who is not an express or named party to the arbitration clause to abide by the arbitration agreement, solely on the basis of closeness of relationship to one of the main parties to the arbitration or on account of some other factor? This of course is the controversial issue of companies and entities which are the alter egos of the state. This issue is increasingly raised, and many consider that it should be determined by the arbitrators rather than a national court. 203 The courts appear to have a mixed approach to this issue. Two recent English cases reached opposite conclusions. In UK Film Finance Inc. v. Royal Bank of Scotland, an arbitration agreement was directed at only two of three parties, and the English court extended the scope of the agreement to cover all three. 204 However, in Starlight Shipping Co. v. Tai Ping Insurance Co., the English court found that it had no jurisdiction to grant an order in favor of the ship manager despite the proceedings being vexatious and oppressive as a matter of English law. 205 In the United States, courts have relied on the principle of estoppel to read an arbitration agreement as covering parties who are not ostensibly party to that agreement. 206 However, in 2007, in Regent Seven Seas Cruises, Inc. v. Rolls Royce, PLC, a federal judge in Miami refused to extend an arbitration agreement in a charter agreement to parties to the related shipbuilding contract. 207 Regent and Radisson had entered into a time charter agreement containing an arbitration clause. Regent was the owner of the vessel. It claimed that Rolls Royce and Alstom "defrauded and deceived" it into installing the Mermaid pod propulsion system. 208 These parties requested that the court compel Regent to arbitrate the dispute based on the charter agreement. U.S. Judge Paul C. Huck of the Southern District of Florida found that the petitioners could not enforce the time-charter's arbitration clause because "[i]t is inconceivable that, as non-signatories, they would be able to compel Regent to arbitrate claims that do not even appear to arise out of the Time Charter agreement." 209 The São Paulo Court of Appeal held that a controlling shareholder was bound by an arbitration agreement included in a contract to which it was not expressly a party, given that there was sufficient evidence of its inherent connection to the legal relationship. 210 Some commentators have gone further than the São Paulo Court and argued for extension when the same economic or operational purpose can be identified. 211 This is a complicated and controversial area and each case can only be discussed on its merits. The real question is who properly should decide what was agreed, and who does it bind: a national court selected by the party wishing to achieve a particular result or the arbitration mechanism selected by the parties?
The main justification for courts to interfere with arbitration in this way is to save costs and time, to ease the administrative burden, and to allow for an efficient settlement of disputes, including consistency of decision making. 212 Although, these objectives are worthy, it is essential that the arbitral process remain autonomous, and it is for arbitrators to decide who the proper parties are and whether third parties were properly covered by this arbitration agreement.
There is a danger that pro-arbitration injunctions will not reach their target because they will not be respected by another court.
213
There also exists the possibility that one injunction leads to a battle of injunctions. 214 For example, in Dependable Highway Express, Inc. v. Navigators Insurance Co., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently considered the situation where Navigators had obtained an injunction from the English courts forbidding Dependable from proceeding with litigation in U.S. courts in relation to an indemnity contract. 215 The Ninth Circuit found that it was not necessary to recognize the English injunction because its sole purpose was to interfere with the U.S. suit. The court stated:
Indeed, "there are limitations to the application of comity. When the foreign act is inherently inconsistent with the policies underlying comity, domestic recognition could tend either to legitimize the aberration or to encourage retaliation, undercutting the realization of the goals served by comity. No nation is under an unremitting obligation to enforce foreign recover indemnity costs, i.e., more than the normal amount of costs allowed under the English system for taxation of costs, the English court stated that, provided that it could be established that the other party was in breach of the arbitration or jurisdiction clause and that the breach had caused the innocent party reasonably to incur legal costs, those costs should normally be recoverable on an indemnity basis. 219 An interesting question is who should determine this damages question: the court where anti-arbitration proceedings are brought or the arbitration tribunal that has jurisdiction? This author suggests it should be the latter that determines damages.
CONCLUSIONS
In relation to the question of whether national court involvement undermines the arbitral process, the answer is that it depends on the nature and circumstances of the involvement. In this respect, it must be remembered that national courts operate in different legal and cultural contexts: there are common law and civil law jurisdictions; developing and developed countries; legal systems with or without political or religious influences. The way that each national court views its relationship to international arbitration is inevitably colored by these factors. 220 However, notwithstanding the above, there are a number of principles that ought to inform the way in which national courts approach the issue of their involvement with international arbitration. First, despite its autonomous character, international arbitration depends on national courts to provide effectiveness, support, and assistance for the process. Second, international arbitration does not depend on national courts for legitimacy; this exists as of right, based on the agreement of the parties, the New York Convention, and [24:489 international arbitration practice. 221 Third, accordingly, national courts should become involved where they are asked to give effect to the agreement to arbitrate and support the process agreed between the parties, including by assisting with the establishment of the tribunal, the protection and collection of evidence for use in the arbitration, and, if need be, preservation of the status quo. Fourth, once an award has been made, courts should seek to give effect to the tribunal's award because it is a recognition of the autonomous character of arbitration, an implied agreement of the parties to honor the award of the arbitrators and the New York Convention-which of course contains the exceptions to the general rule. 222 Fifth, with respect to injunctions, all injunctions have the capacity to be abused and used as vehicles for mischief making. If an injunction fails to reach its target, it will not be respected by another court and could be a source of a second litigious front, which the parties no doubt would have wished to avoid. There also exists the possibility that one injunction leads to a battle of injunctions. Antisuit injunctions, which aim to restrain a party from resorting to a national court, are often justified. They support the arbitration process by directing parties to the forum chosen by the parties to determine their differences. The main focus in deciding whether to grant an injunction ought to be the parties' agreement to settle their dispute by arbitration rather than issues of oppression or fairness or any broader effects of the decision on matters of comity. These injunctions ought to be granted only by the seat of the arbitration and prior to an award's being granted. The tribunal can then, as it is authorized and in accordance with the competence-competence doctrine, determine its own jurisdiction.
Most abusive are the anti-arbitration injunctions. Although these are rare, they are often applied for with the specific intention of undermining the arbitration process. Here again this is not a matter for a court: if there is some reason the arbitration cannot or should not proceed, this should be determined by the method chosen by the parties, i.e., an arbitration tribunal. Pro-arbitration orders may well stem from good intentions, but they run the risk of undermining the arbitration process by failing to recognize the self-correcting 221. New York Convention, supra note 10, art. I. 222. Id., art. V. measures built into the arbitration system. 223 An over-zealous court is in clear danger of trespassing on the domain of the arbitral tribunal and/or pre-empting the decision of such a tribunal. The safest course is for the national court to content itself with offering passive support and recognition.
Further, national courts should take a hands-off approach when parties have agreed on arbitration because there is an inevitable parochialism in every national court-no matter how strongly it avows an internationalist perspective. Every international arbitration gives rise to a unique blend of legal perspectives that derive from the various backgrounds of the participating lawyers, arbitrators, and parties. 224 A national court asked to intervene cannot possibly fully take account of these perspectives in reaching its decisions. The same cannot be said of the arbitrators who are intimately involved in the arbitration and are therefore well (or at least much better) placed to understand its every nuance. As a matter of practical wisdom, matters are very often best left to them to decide.
However, it is also the case that arbitrators and parties must give national courts due respect because it is the national courts that ultimately hold the keys to recognition and enforcement. To return to the analogy used earlier, if national courts refuse to provide the nourishment and sustenance sought at the right time and in the right place, the giant squid of international arbitration might be forced into shallower waters, where it will inevitably find itself in peril. 
